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Since its inception in the 1950s, cognitive science has been a community driven by
two primary forces. The first is a doctrine: that the mind is a collection of computational
processes. The second is an attitude: that investigation of the mind should draw
simultaneously on the methods and ideas of several traditionally separate disciplines. The
first of these forces calls itself ‘computationalism’, ‘representationalism’, ‘information
processing’, or ‘cognitivism’, and its main manifestations have been the sub-paradigms
of symbol-processing and connectionism. The second has produced valuable interaction
between the disciplines of psychology, philosophy, artificial intelligence, linguistics and
neuroscience. In their stronger forms, these forces argue that the operation of the
mind is essentially computational, and that the various ‘contributing disciplines’ should
amalgamate into a single, united federation. In their more moderate forms, they argue that
it is useful some of the time to view and model the mind in computational terms, and that
the relevant disciplines have more to offer each other than their differences in terminology
might suggest. The two forces are related, since the computational view has a place in all
of the contributing disciplines; but they are also independent, since interaction between
these disciplines has gained its own momentum, and does not necessitate a commitment to
computationalism of one sort or another.
Cognitive science has now acquired its first encyclopaedia, in the form of The MIT
Encyclopedia of the Cognitive Sciences (MITECS), published in 1999. This contains six
introductory essays or ‘road maps’, followed by 471 individual articles, and occupies over
1,000 pages. The individual entries are short, authoritative and admirably accessible. Links
between topics and between contributing disciplines are emphasised by extensive cross-
referencing, and by the introductory essays on Philosophy, Psychology, Neurosciences,
Computational Intelligence, Linguistics and Language, and Culture, Cognition and
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Evolution. The authors of these entries and essays include some but not all of the
‘big names’ associated with the ideas which are presented. We find, for example,
Margaret Boden (on Artificial Life), Patricia Churchland (on Computation and the Brain),
Donald Davidson (on Anomalous Monism), Daniel Dennett (on the Intentional Stance),
Fred Dretske (on Informational Semantics), Annette Karmiloff-Smith (on Modularity of
Mind), Stephen Kosslyn (on Imagery), Robert Kowalski (on Logic Programming), James
McClelland (on Connectionist Modelling), Donald Michie (on Alan Turing), Ulric Neisser
(on Ecological Psychology), John Searle (on the Chinese Room Argument), Herbert
Simon (on Allen Newell, Problem Solving and Production Systems), Paul Smolensky
(on Connectionist Approaches to Language and Optimality Theory), Dan Sperber (on
Metarepresentation and co-author of the final introductory essay), Stephen Stich (on
Eliminative Materialism), Paul Thagard (on Explanation and Induction), and many others.
However, we do not find Rodney Brooks, Noam Chomsky, Andy Clark, the brothers
Dreyfus, Jerry Fodor, George Lakoff, John McCarthy, Marvin Minsky, Donald Norman,
Josef Perner, Hilary Putnam, Zenon Pylyshyn or Terry Winograd. Purchase of MITECS
entitles the owner to access the on-line version of the work, implemented as an interactive
website. This has the usual advantages: it is searchable, the editors will be able to update
it as necessary, it can be reached when the book itself is not to hand, and lists of references
can be copied over into the user’s own documents or database. At present, the search facility
has a tendency to produce duplicate links leading to the same entry, but no doubt this will
be fixed in time.
The editorial policy of cognitive science’s first encyclopaedia is friendly to both of its
subject’s primary forces. With regard to multidisciplinarity, we find coverage which is
even broader than might be expected. There are treatments of Freud, James, Piaget and
Vygotsky among the psychologists, and of Hume and Descartes among the philosophers;
and there are articles on Autism (although not on schizophrenia or depression), Creoles,
Meter and Poetry, and Religious Ideas and Practices. MITECS is thus constructive, rather
than merely descriptive, in that its breadth and cross-referencing reveal links which are
not immediately evident from within its individual contributing disciplines: and in this
respect it will serve students of these disciplines well as a source of context, history,
perspective and ideas. With regard to the doctrine of computationalism, we find a tendency
to hospitable illustration rather than confrontation. There are entries on ‘Computational X’
and ‘Cognitive Y’ amongst a range of other topics; there is some critical treatment in the
entries on Computational Theory of Mind and the Chinese Room Argument; but we do
not find entries on ‘cognitivism’, ‘cognitive psychology’, ‘history of cognitive science’ or
‘representationalism’.
The computational thesis in psychology has a distinctive history. Behaviourism, since
the 1900s, had argued that all we really know is that people behave: they speak and act, and
the rest is conjecture. A scientific psychology therefore requires that we confine ourselves
to the study of overt behaviour. Cognitive science began in effect with the argument
that this is too convenient: a behaviourist methodology may be hygienic, but it is fatally
limited in scope. Thus in the 1950s, Lashley argued that the existence of serially ordered
behaviour implies the existence of higher-order representations, and Chomsky argued
that the phenomena of language and communication cannot adequately be described in
purely behavioural terms. As it developed, this new mentalism took courage from the
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computer, whose inner workings are relatively well understood, and labelled its objects
as ‘cognitive’ or ‘representational’. In doing this, it posited the existence of various inner
mental entities: representations, procedures and modules reminiscent of the datastructures,
algorithms and modules of a computer program. This carried various attractions: it put
the ‘psyche’ back into ‘psychology’; it produced an apparent exactitude; and it brought
psychology and engineering together, since the inner entities driving the mind translate
easily to the components of computer programs designed to model the mind. However,
it also carried the danger of what might be called ‘convenient re-labelling’. This is a
form of pseudo-explanation in which we take a known phenomenon or experimentally
established regularity, give it a new label, and then treat this as the name for an inner entity
or mechanism (a representation, metarepresentation, module, etc.) which is the reason for
the phenomenon. In other fields the result might be the statement that sleep is due to an
inner dormative force, or that a car’s acceleration is due to an acceleration mechanism
located somewhere in its interior. As argued by Bowler [1], such explanations can become
tautologous and may produce something closer to alchemy than science, since they confuse
underlying reasons with observed phenomena. And if this occurs here, the irony is that
cognitive science will not abandon behaviourism as intended, but will merely supplement
it with a new form of expression.
The general effect of MITECS’s many pages, however, is to illustrate the varieties
and applications of computationalism rather than to confront the issue of its explanatory
force. And the problems here are that the critic may feel unsatisfied, and the newcomer
may be hypnotised into thinking that the mind’s new labels are names for previously
undiscovered natural phenomena, rather than elements in a useful but perhaps limited form
of interpretation. One of these labels is (mental) ‘representation’. The introductory essay
on Psychology starts by saying that this is ‘the science that investigates the representation
and processing of information by complex organisms . . . capable of . . . forming internal
representations, and manipulating these representations to select and execute actions’.
The entry on Mental Representation distinguishes two ways in which these can be
implemented, five ways in which they can be grounded, and six categories into which
they can fall (mentioning at the end some possible problems with the concept). And
the entries on Cognitive Modelling, Connectionist and Cognitive Modelling, Symbolic
present the main details of their alternative views of how mental representation should
be modelled (the second discussing some issues in the theory of modelling). Another label
is ‘computation’. Here the entry on Computation makes the point that several different
concepts of computation are applicable in cognitive science; half of the entry on the
Computational Theory of Mind is devoted to this doctrine’s problems and limitations; and
the entry on ‘Language and Communication’ is critical of the grounding of communication
in a ‘disembodied symbol manipulation device’. Yet another label is ‘theory of mind’.
This has appeared in discussions of ‘mindreading’: our capacity to work out and predict
each other’s thoughts and feelings, empathise, and see alternative points of view. Here the
‘theory–theory’ (convenient to the computational paradigm) presents us all as everyday
cognitive scientists: we employ, test and develop an organised body of knowledge about
minds, labelled ‘theory of mind’ or ‘folk psychology’; and deficiency in mindreading, as
seen in young children and people with autism, is explained as being due to deficiency
in such knowledge. Opposed to this is the ‘simulation-theory’ which says that we achieve
216 D.M. Peterson / Artificial Intelligence 130 (2001) 213–216
mindreading by using ourselves as cognitive models: we entertain ‘pretend inputs’, we
work out how we would think and feel under these conditions, and we then attribute the
result to the other person. Thus, when we say for example, ‘I think that P thinks that X’:
the theory–theory holds it as crucial that we formulate a mental object of the form ‘A
R1 (P R2 X)’, labelled as a ‘metarepresentation’; and the simulation-theory holds it as
crucial that we have the wherewithal to use our own system as a model of another. Turning
to MITECS, we find several relevant entries. The article on Folk Psychology identifies a
confusion and some alternative positions in the literature, without making it clear that the
main role of this label is to refer to a heavily loaded account of mindreading. The entry
on Metarepresentation starts by saying that cognitive systems ‘are characterised by the
ability to construct and process representations of objects and states of affairs’: it goes
on to outline areas in which this notion arises, but nowhere does it explicitly ask whether
‘metarepresentation’ is a label for a type of behaviour or a name for a complex inner entity.
Elsewhere we fare better: the article on Theory of Mind provides an informative survey
of evidence from developmental psychology, and judiciously observes that ‘we have a
better sense of when various developments take place than of the mechanisms that underlie
these changes’; and the entry on Simulation vs. Theory–Theory explicitly asks whether our
performance in mindreading is due to the possession of theoretical knowledge.
The problem with The MIT Encyclopedia of the Cognitive Sciences is not that it is
wilfully biased, nor that it unevenly reflects the balance of voices which have spoken during
50 years under the name of ‘cognitive science’. Rather, the problem is that this balance
favours a tradition which has already begun to wane. This tradition began with the Socratic
‘logos’, it emerged again in the Cartesian ‘idea’, and it has recently re-labelled behavioural
phenomena in terms of current computer technology. In this important volume we do
hear an alternative, emerging voice (as in the entries on Situated Cognition and Learning,
Situatedness/Embeddedness, and Language and Communication), but the greater weight
of words is given to computationalist psychology of one sort or another. As a book for
believers, this new encyclopaedia does a good job of illustrating this doctrine: the quality
and accessibility of its entries are impressive, and in this regard it will serve its community
well. However, the future credibility of cognitive science may depend on its engagement
with computationalism as a useful but perhaps limited and even superficial doctrine, and
what I would like to see in a second edition is less evasion of this issue.
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